For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work.
This extract shows how a Master’s-level report for EG7060 Mental Wealth: Professional Life can be structured under the heading “Understanding of Engineering Management Principles”. It compares two UK rail accidents from the Royal Academy of Engineering’s Engineering X collection. You can see the original task on the EG7060 coursework question page, and a step-by-step method in our blog on how to assess engineering management through case studies. If you want the full report written to your own brief, see our engineering assignment help in Singapore.
What this sample covers
The extract is a short slice of a 4,000 to 5,000-word report. It does not include the full literature review, the recommendations section or the presentation script.
- Selection of two similar cases and a short justification for the pairing.
- A comparison framework built on risk management, leadership, communication, safety culture and professional responsibility.
- A critical assessment of the first two themes, with evidence from each case.
- A short illustrative risk-control table showing how findings can be turned into management actions.
- Harvard in-text citations and a reference list.
| Brief requirement (paraphrased) | Where it appears in this extract |
|---|---|
| Two similar Engineering X safety-critical case studies | Section 1 |
| Critical assessment, not description | Sections 2 and 3 |
| Link to engineering management principles | Sections 2 to 4 |
| Harvard referencing, British English | Throughout and References |
Understanding of Engineering Management Principles
1. Case selection and rationale
The two cases chosen are “Bexley train crash – a system failure” (Elliott, n.d.) and “Revisiting the causes of the Hatfield Rail Crash” (Kemp, n.d.). Both are British rail accidents. Both followed the break-up of British Rail into separate infrastructure, maintenance and operating companies. Both involved a maintenance contractor working for Railtrack.
That shared context makes comparison fair. The differences are useful too. Bexley involved three immediate causes acting together, while Hatfield centred on one failure mechanism that had been known about for years.
| Feature | Bexley (1997) | Hatfield (2000) |
|---|---|---|
| Event | Goods train derailed on 4 February 1997; four people seriously injured | InterCity 225 derailed on 17 October 2000; four people died, over 70 injured |
| Immediate cause | Rotten timbers, an overloaded wagon and excess speed together | Fracture of the outer rail from fatigue cracking |
| Management setting | Railtrack and a maintenance contractor after privatisation | Railtrack and Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd after privatisation |
| Main management theme | No single owner of the risk; audits not carried out | Known risk not controlled; responsibility split across parties |
2. Risk management
Elliott (n.d.) argues that the Bexley derailment needed all three immediate causes to occur together. Track with rotten timbers, a wagon about 30% over its permitted weight and a train about 37% over the speed limit combined. From a management viewpoint, each defect sat in a different organisation’s remit, so nobody was positioned to see the combined exposure.
The Hatfield account shows a different risk failure. Kemp (n.d.) explains that rolling contact fatigue had been studied by British Rail in the 1970s and was a recognised hazard. A warning in December 1999 said the Railtrack line specification was insufficient to guard against it. The hazard was identified. It was not managed.
Taken together, the cases challenge a purely component-based view of risk. Reason (2000) describes the “person” and “system” approaches to error, and argues that the system approach looks for the defences that failed rather than a person to blame. Both reports fit that reading. A fault in one place was able to cause harm because the surrounding controls were weak or unowned.
A critical point worth making is that Reason’s layered-defence idea has limits here. Kemp (n.d.) suggests it works less well for systems split across several parties, because no one holds a view of all the layers. A strong report states this tension openly and then uses it to judge the quality of each organisation’s risk process.
3. Leadership and communication
Both cases show leadership failing at the interfaces between organisations. In Bexley, the contractor communicated poorly with Railtrack, went through major staff restructuring and left a critical post vacant (Elliott, n.d.). Railtrack did not follow its own audit plan. Contract arrangements were complex and poorly defined.
At Hatfield, responsibility for the wheel and rail interface was spread across many parties, with no forum to discuss emerging risks and no single person or body accountable for overall safety (Kemp, n.d.). Kemp also notes that Railtrack lost much of British Rail’s engineering knowledge to contractors.
The management principle at stake is accountability. Where leadership roles are fragmented, informal relationships replace systems. Elliott (n.d.) describes exactly this at Bexley: practices based on personal relationships were never replaced by a systematic safety management system.
Edmondson (1999) offers a useful lens on communication. Her study of 51 work teams linked psychological safety, a shared belief that it is safe to take interpersonal risks, to learning behaviour. A report can use this to ask whether staff at either organisation could realistically raise concerns about overload, speedometers or rail condition. The case texts do not measure psychological safety, so the claim should be stated as an interpretation, not a finding.
4. Turning findings into management actions
Markers reward assessments that end in practical controls. The table below shows the form such a section can take. The ratings are illustrative and are not taken from either case study.
| Finding | Management principle | Proposed control | Priority (illustrative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit plan not followed | Monitoring and review | Independent audit schedule with named owner and escalation route | High (illustrative) |
| Known fatigue risk not controlled | Risk ownership | Single accountable manager for each recognised hazard, reviewed at board level | High (illustrative) |
| Weak contractor interface | Communication and contracts | Shared hazard log and joint review meetings | Medium (illustrative) |
| Restructuring without safety review | Change management | “Safety due diligence” before major reorganisation, as Kemp (n.d.) proposes | High (illustrative) |
The remaining themes, safety culture and professional responsibility, would follow in the full report. They would link the Bexley discussion of just culture and witness protection to Hatfield’s finding that box-ticking verification did not ensure safety.
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Further help
If your module has a similar brief, our coursework writing help page explains how we support structure and referencing. Our team also offers report writing help and can show a related engineering example in the PSB7094MAA Global Engineering Strategy sample. LSBF students can also browse other briefs on the LSBF question hub.
About the expert
This extract was prepared under the guidance of Han Lee, who holds a PhD in Mechanical Engineering from Nanyang Technological University and has worked as an academic writer for six years and as a design engineer for two years.
References
- Edmondson, A. (1999) ‘Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), pp. 350–383. doi:10.2307/2666999.
- Elliott, C. (n.d.) Bexley train crash – a system failure. Engineering X, Royal Academy of Engineering. Available at: https://engineeringx.raeng.org.uk/media/m3kbpmdm/engx-bexley-train-crash-a-system-failure.pdf (Accessed: 27 October 2026).
- Kemp, R. (n.d.) Revisiting the causes of the Hatfield Rail Crash. Engineering X, Royal Academy of Engineering. Available at: https://engineeringx.raeng.org.uk/media/sogkgnhl/engx-revisiting-the-causes-of-the-hatfield-rail-crash.pdf (Accessed: 27 October 2026).
- Reason, J. (2000) ‘Human error: models and management’, BMJ, 320(7237), pp. 768–770. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1117770/ (Accessed: 27 October 2026).
