For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work.
This is an abridged model-answer extract for the SOE09702 International Business coursework on Sainsbury’s expansion. It covers one country only (Australia), as the brief requires, and keeps the section order a marker expects. For the approach behind it, read our guide on how to structure the SOE09702 country-entry report. Figures marked “illustrative” are teaching assumptions, not company data.
Planning table: marks mapped to sections
| Criterion (weight) | Where it is answered | Approx. words |
|---|---|---|
| Presentation and structure (5%) | Numbered sections, executive summary, tables | 150 |
| Political, economic, cultural, legal and ethical risks (30%) | Section 2 | 850 |
| Business opportunities (30%) | Section 3 | 750 |
| Company examples (10%) | Woven into Sections 2, 3 and 4 | 300 |
| Conclusion and recommendations (20%) | Sections 4 and 5 | 600 |
| Referencing, APA 7 (5%) | In-text and reference list | n/a |
1. Introduction and scope
Sainsbury’s is a UK grocery retailer whose home market is mature and price-competitive. This report advises the board on whether Australia deserves capital, judged mainly by likely return on investment. Brazil is not assessed.
The answer is a conditional no-go on a large store-led entry, and a staged, capital-light route instead. Sections 2 and 3 set out the evidence, Section 4 tests the return, and Section 5 proposes the entry mode.
2. Risk analysis
2.1 Political risk (Root’s four-part view)
Root’s framework separates political risk into instability, ownership and control, operations, and transfer. For Australia the first and last are low. The more useful finding is that operating risk is the one that costs money.
| Root category | Rating | What it means for Sainsbury’s |
|---|---|---|
| Instability | Low | Stable institutions; no realistic threat to trading from unrest or regime change. |
| Ownership and control | Low to moderate | No expropriation risk, but foreign acquisitions are screened under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth), so a large buy-in can be delayed or conditioned. |
| Operations | Moderate to high | Planning and zoning, site access and a concentrated supplier base slow roll-out and raise unit costs (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [ACCC], 2025). |
| Transfer | Low | Profits can be repatriated; the real exposure is currency translation of Australian dollar earnings into sterling. |
The ACCC (2025) found that site availability is limited by planning and zoning laws, that Coles and Woolworths hold more than 150 undeveloped sites (so-called land banking), and that large-scale entry is unlikely in the short to medium term. Aldi, the one successful discount entrant, took more than 20 years to reach its present position. For Sainsbury’s this means a slower ramp-up and a longer period of losses than a standard UK new-store model would show.
2.2 Economic and competitive risk
Australian grocery is concentrated. The ACCC (2025) puts national supermarket shares at roughly 38% for Woolworths, 29% for Coles, 9% for Aldi and 7% for Metcash, which supplies independent stores. Two firms hold about two-thirds of sales. That share gives them purchasing power over suppliers, which a newcomer without volume cannot match on day one.
Kaufland shows the cost of misjudging this. The German group bought roughly two dozen sites from 2017 and began building a large distribution centre in Melbourne, then announced in January 2020 that it was leaving before trading, saying it wanted better returns in Europe (Niesche, 2020; Real Estate Source, 2020). The lesson is that fixed assets arrive long before sales do.
2.3 Cultural risk (Hofstede, with the UK as the home benchmark)
| Dimension | Australia | UK | Reading for Sainsbury’s |
|---|---|---|---|
| Power distance | 36 | 35 | Flat management and informal staff relations in both; UK store culture transfers easily. |
| Individualism | 90 | 89 | Near-identical; personalised loyalty offers (Nectar-style) should resonate. |
| Masculinity | 61 | 66 | Similar achievement orientation; little adjustment needed in incentives. |
| Uncertainty avoidance | 51 | 35 | Australia is somewhat more rule-bound, which fits its detailed retail codes and compliance culture. |
Scores as published in Hofstede et al. (2010); long-term orientation and indulgence are left out here, so check the current figures for your own report.
The gap is small on every dimension, so national culture is not the main barrier. Ghemawat (2001) argues that cultural, administrative, geographic and economic distance each shape the cost of entry; Australia is close to the UK on the first two but far away on geography. The practical cultural risk is shopper behaviour: Australians are used to Aldi’s private-label model and the two majors’ loyalty schemes, so a UK-style own-brand pitch is not new.
2.4 Legal and ethical risk
Three regimes matter. First, the mandatory Food and Grocery Code has applied since 1 April 2025 to grocers with annual revenue above A$5 billion; breaches can carry penalties of at least A$10 million (Clayton Utz, 2025). Sainsbury’s would start below that threshold but should build supplier terms as if covered. Second, the Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) requires entities with consolidated revenue of at least A$100 million to report on supply-chain risks (Australian Maritime Safety Authority, n.d.). Third, workplace law sets pay and conditions that raise labour costs per store.
On ethics, Transparency International (2026) scores Australia 76 and the UK 70 on its Corruption Perceptions Index, so bribery exposure is lower than at home. The sharper ethical risks are fair dealing with farmers and suppliers, labour practices in fresh-produce supply and packaging waste. Each can become a reputational issue quickly in a market where the ACCC has recorded falling consumer trust in supermarket pricing.
3. Opportunities
Sainsbury’s has three assets that are visible in the UK: a strong own-label range, the Nectar loyalty data and the Argos catalogue-and-collection format. None of them has to be copied across store by store.
| Opportunity | Evidence | Fit with Sainsbury’s | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Own-label premium and mid-tier ranges | Aldi is a lower-priced alternative but does not compete on every product (ACCC, 2025) | High: UK own-label strength | 1 |
| Loyalty and retail media | Shoppers compare prices more and trust pricing less (ACCC, 2025) | Medium to high: data capability, but local build needed | 2 |
| Convenience and fresh in dense suburbs | Planning limits large sites | Medium: smaller formats avoid some land constraints | 3 |
| Large-format hypermarket | Kaufland’s pipeline and exit | Low: capital heavy, untested for Sainsbury’s | 4 |
Dunning’s (1988) eclectic paradigm helps here. Sainsbury’s has ownership advantages (brand, own-label know-how), and Australia offers location advantages (a wealthy, stable market). The weak point is internalisation: whether Sainsbury’s should run the business itself or let a local partner do so. Its own history argues for caution. It bought control of Egypt’s Edge SAE in 1999 and agreed to sell in December 2000 amid a consumer boycott and mounting losses (Funding Universe, n.d.; “Sainsbury’s Egyptian misadventure”, 2015). Tesco, similarly, confirmed in 2013 that it would leave the US and sell Fresh & Easy (Retail Gazette, 2013). Large British grocers have a poor record when they enter alone.
4. Return on investment and go/no-go
The table compares two illustrative routes. Every number below is an assumption for teaching purposes, not Sainsbury’s data. Mature operating profit is stores multiplied by sales per store multiplied by margin, divided by capital invested, tested against an illustrative 10% hurdle rate.
| Route and case | Capital (A$m) | Mature sales (A$m) | Margin | Operating profit (A$m) | Return on capital |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Greenfield, 25 stores: low | 875 | 1,125 | 2.0% | 22.5 | 2.6% |
| A. Greenfield: base | 875 | 1,500 | 3.5% | 52.5 | 6.0% |
| A. Greenfield: high | 875 | 1,875 | 4.5% | 84.4 | 9.6% |
| B. Partnership, own-label: low | 60 | 120 | 4.0% | 4.8 | 8.0% |
| B. Partnership: base | 60 | 180 | 5.0% | 9.0 | 15.0% |
| B. Partnership: high | 60 | 240 | 6.0% | 14.4 | 24.0% |
Route A assumes 25 stores at A$25m each plus a A$250m distribution centre, with sales per store of A$45m, A$60m and A$75m (all illustrative).
Route A fails the hurdle even in its high case, and that is before counting the years of start-up losses and currency risk. Route B passes in the base and high cases because it avoids property and distribution outlay, though it also earns far less in absolute terms (A$9.0m against A$52.5m in the base case). A board should read that trade-off plainly: Route B buys information cheaply, Route A buys scale expensively.
Recommendation: no-go on Route A at present; go on Route B as a staged pilot with defined exit triggers.
5. Entry strategy
Root’s (1998) entry-mode logic ranks options by control against resource commitment and risk. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) add that firms commit more as they learn about a market, which supports starting small. The proposal has three stages.
- Stage 1 (year 1 to 2): partnership pilot. Supply own-label ranges through an established Australian wholesaler or retailer under licence or a joint venture. This tests demand without buying land. The partner would also hold the supplier relationships that Kaufland lacked.
- Stage 2 (year 3): decision gate. Scale only if the pilot reaches agreed targets for sales per store, gross margin and repeat purchase, and if planning or site-access reform improves entry conditions.
- Stage 3 (year 4 onward): selective expansion. Add small-format stores or a larger stake in the partner, funded from pilot profits, rather than a distribution centre ahead of demand.
Main risks to the plan are partner dependence, brand dilution through a licensee and the majors’ response through price cuts. Mitigation is a clear contract on quality standards, step-in rights and an exit clause tied to the Stage 2 targets.
6. Conclusion
Australia is a stable, wealthy and culturally close market, yet a highly concentrated one where sites, scale and supplier access protect the incumbents. The numbers do not support a store-led entry now. A capital-light pilot keeps the option open at a fraction of the exposure.
Where to go next
If you are building your own report, our international business assignment help page explains how we support country-entry coursework, and the report writing help page covers structure and formatting. You can browse more briefs in the Edinburgh Napier question library, or submit your own brief for a quote.
References
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2025). Supermarkets inquiry: Final report. https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/supermarkets-inquiry_1.pdf
Australian Maritime Safety Authority. (n.d.). Modern Slavery Act 2018. https://amsa.gov.au/modern-slavery-act-2018
Clayton Utz. (2025, April). Mandatory Food and Grocery Code of Conduct is now in force. https://claytonutz.com/insights/2025/april/mandatory-food-and-grocery-code-of-conduct-is-now-in-force
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490372
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth). https://www.legislation.gov.au
Funding Universe. (n.d.). J Sainsbury plc history. https://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/j-sainsbury-plc-history/
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters: The hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business Review, 79(8), 137–147.
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind (3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill.
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm: A model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of International Business Studies, 8(1), 23–32. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490676
Niesche, C. (2020). Discount supermarket Kaufland’s exit highlights poor state of Australian retail. NZ Herald. https://nzherald.co.nz/business/christopher-niesche-discount-supermarket-kauflands-exit-highlights-poor-state-of-australian-retail/MIP7GDQFW3CSDV474UFWLD4J3A
Real Estate Source. (2020). Kaufland withdraws from Australia after creating development pipeline. https://www.realestatesource.com.au/kaufland-withdraws-from-australia-after-creating-development-pipeline/
Retail Gazette. (2013, September). Tesco lend Yucaipa £80m to take Fresh & Easy off its hands. https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2013/09/42110-tesco-lend-yucaipa-80m-to-take-fresh-easy-off-its-hands/
Root, F. R. (1998). Entry strategies for international markets (Rev. ed.). Jossey-Bass.
Sainsbury’s Egyptian misadventure: Did company misread its new customer-base? (2015). Strategic Direction, 31(3), 4–6. https://doi.org/10.1108/SD-12-2014-0178
Transparency International. (2026). Corruption Perceptions Index 2025. https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/australia